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COMMENT
THE SECOND CIRCUIT TAKES OFF IN A
NEW DIRECTION: AIRPORT TERMINALS
DEEMED NONPUBLIC FORA IN
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA
CONSCIOUSNESS, INC. v. LEE
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
broadly guarantees freedom of speech and expression against gov-
ernment regulation.1 First Amendment protections, however, do
not exempt all speech from government restrictions under all cir-
cumstances.2 Pursuant to what is known as the "public-forum doc-
1 U.S. CONST. amend I. The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." Id.
Historically, commentators have strongly disagreed over the intent of the framers in
adopting the First Amendment. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW § 16.5, at 938 (4th ed. 1991) (questions concerning meaning of First Amendment
are raised continually); see also THOMAS L. TEDFORD, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED
STATES (1985) (historical perspective). For contrasting views of the framers' intent, compare
ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 19-21 (1941) (to framers, free-
dom of speech meant right of unrestricted discussion of public affairs) with LEONARD WIL-
LIAMS LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN
HISTORY 35 (1960) (framers were not libertarians on subject of free expression).
2 See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
647 (1981) ("First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one's views at
all times and places or in any manner that may be desired") (citations omitted); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971) ("First and Fourteenth Amendments have never been
thought to give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or wherever he
pleases, or to use any form of address in any circumstances that he chooses").
Certain types of speech have long been considered to be outside the protection of the
First Amendment. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In Chaplinsky,
Justice Murphy stated the following:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the preven-
tion and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
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trine," for instance, the government may regulate protected speech
on publicly-owned property.'
The public-forum doctrine divides public property into three
categories: traditional public fora,4 designated public fora,5 and
insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.
Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted).
Some types of speech fall within the protection of the First Amendment, but are af-
forded less protection than other forms of expression. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 1,
§ 16.1, at 934 (Supreme Court has developed various tests to evaluate restrictions on differ-
ent types of speech). Commercial speech, for example, does not enjoy the same status as
political speech. Compare Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26 (offensive language on jacket constituted
political speech entitled to highest level of protection) with Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 558, 561-66 (1980) (to come within protection
of First Amendment, commercial speech must be neither misleading nor related to illegal
activity).
I See United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990). Justice O'Connor summarized
public-forum analysis as follows:
In Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, the Court announced a
tripartite framework for determining how First Amendment interests are to be
analyzed with respect to Government property. Regulation of speech activity on
governmental property that has been traditionally open to the public for expres-
sive activity, such as public streets and parks, is examined under strict scrutiny.
Regulation of speech on property that the Government has expressly dedicated to
speech activity is also examined under strict scrutiny. But regulation of speech
activity where the Government has not dedicated its property to First Amend-
ment Activity is examined only for reasonableness.
Id. at 3119-20 (citations omitted).
Since the concept of a public forum was first enunciated, see Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496, 515-16 (1939), the public-forum doctrine has been subjected to unrelenting criticism
because it focuses on the nature of the property to which restrictions on the freedom of
speech are applied rather than considering the First Amendment values implicated by
speech restrictions. See C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in
First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 109, 110 (1986) (nonpublic-forum doc-
trine yields "inadequate jurisprudence of labels"); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The
Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment
Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1234-35 (1984) (classification of public places into types
of fora confuses judicial opinions by diverting attention from First Amendment issues); Toni
M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 211, 261 (1991) (doctrine is "incoherent" and "analytically dubious" and re-
sults in "overbroad, often senseless, cordoning off of public space from the first amend-
ment."); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory
of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1715 (1987) (doctrine poses obstacle to "sensi-
tive first amendment analysis" as well as "realistic appreciation of government's require-
ments in controlling its own property"); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions,
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 93 (1987) (doctrine's "myopic focus on formalistic labels ... serves
only to distract attention from the real stakes").
' See, e.g., Frisby v Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480 (1988) (sidewalk adjacent to private
residence considered traditional public forum); Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d
83, 90 (2d Cir.) (deeming Port Authority bus terminal traditional public forum), cert. de-
nied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968).
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nonpublic fora.6 While restrictions on the content of speech in
nonpublic fora need only be reasonable, similar restrictions in
areas "traditionally open to assembly" or "expressly dedicated to
speech activity" must be narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling
state interest.7 Because municipal airport terminals have consist-
ently been deemed traditional public fora, efforts to exclude speak-
ers from terminals have been subjected to the highest level of First
Amendment scrutiny.' Recently, however, in International Society
Once a court has determined that a forum is public, the government may enforce a
content-based restriction on speech only if the regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). The government may also enforce content-
neutral time, manner, and place restrictions if they are "narrowly tailored to serve a signifi-
cant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication."
Id.; see also Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (ordinance requiring permit
for parades on public streets constitutes reasonable time, manner, place restriction).
5 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (university policy of making
meeting facilities available to registered student groups creates public forum for their use);
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (municipal auditorium
and city-leased theater designed for and dedicated to expressive activities constitute public
fora). A designated public forum is created when the government opens property to the
public for purposes of expressive activity. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. Although the
government need not keep the forum open indefinitely, so long as it does, restrictions on
speech are subject to the same scrutiny applied to traditional public fora. Id. at 46. Thus,
content-based prohibitions in designated public fora must be narrowly tailored to meet sig-
nificant state interests, and restrictions on time, manner, and place are permitted only if
reasonable. Id.
See, e.g., City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 813-15 (1984) (utility
poles not traditional or designated public forum); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 128 (1981) (letterbox not public forum).
When public property is not by tradition or designation a forum for public expression,
it may be reserved "for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the
regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because
public officials oppose the speaker's view." Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46.
" See supra notes 4-6 (case law involving three categories of fora).
' See, e.g., Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Board of Airport Comm'rs, 785 F.2d 791, 792-95 (9th
Cir. 1986) (compelling governmental interest needed to justify limiting distribution of reli-
gious literature in airport), afl'd on other grounds, 482 U.S. 567 (1987); United States S.W.
Africa/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United States, 708 F.2d 760, 774 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (governments must have compelling reasons to ban political advertisements in air-
ports); Fernandes v Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 626-27 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S.
1124 (1982); Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921, 925-26 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F.2d 1130, 1131
(9th Cir. 1973) (must be narrowly-drawn regulations which serve legitimate interests to limit
distribution of written materials). But see International Caucus of Labor Comm'n v. Dade
County, Fla., 724 F. Supp. 917, 924 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (deeming Miami International Airport
terminal nonpublic forum).
The Supreme Court has yet to address the status of airport terminals as public or non-
public fora. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 925 F.2d 576,
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for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee ("ISKCON"), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, determining that
airport terminals are nonpublic fora for purposes of First Amend-
ment analysis,'0 upheld a regulation prohibiting the in-person so-
licitation of funds at three New York-area airports." At the same
time, the court recognized a distinction between "the disruptive ef-
fect of the in-person solicitation of funds and the lesser inconve-
nience of the distribution of literature" and struck down the por-
tion of the regulation that prohibited the distribution of literature
in airport terminals. 2
In ISKCON, the plaintiffs challenged a regulation promul-
gated by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey that
prohibited the solicitation of funds and the distribution of litera-
ture in the terminals at Kennedy, LaGuardia, and Newark air-
ports." The plaintiffs contended that because the terminal areas
578 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3083 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1992). Although presented
with the opportunity in Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. at 573-75, which involved a challenge
to a regulation prohibiting all First-Amendment activity in the terminals at Los Angeles
International Airport, the Court found it unnecessary to decide the issue. Id. Rather, it
invalidated the challenged regulation on the grounds that its overbreadth created a virtual
"First Amendment Free Zone." Id. at 574. For an interesting discussion of the Court's deci-
sion in Jews for Jesus, Inc. and a critical view of public-forum analysis, see generally Lonnie
S. Davis, Note, Board of Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.: A Missed Opportunity to
Restore Fundamental Fairness to Public Forum Analysis, 8 PACE L. REv. 607, 626 (1988).
925 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1991), petition for cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3475 (U.S. Jan. 10,
1992).
'o Id. at 581.
Id. at 581-82.
12 Id. at 582.
s Id. at 577-78. ISKCON is a nonprofit religious corporation, whose members practice
a religious ritual known as sankirtan. Id. at 577. This ritual requires members of the organi-
zation to disseminate religious literature and to solicit funds in order to support the reli-
gious movement of the group as well as to defray printing and distribution costs. Id. at 577-
78. The Port Authority regulation affecting the New York-area airports states, in pertinent
part, the following:
1. The following conduct is prohibited within the interior areas of buildings or
structures at an air terminal if conducted by a person to or with passers-by in a
continuous or repetitive manner:
(a) The sale or distribution of any merchandise, including but not limited to, jew-
elry, food stuffs, candles, flowers, badges and clothing.
(b) The sale or distribution of flyers, brochures, pamphlets, books or any other
printed or written material.
(c) The solicitation and receipt of funds.
Id. at 578-79.
Although the members of ISKCON originally challenged the regulation as applied to
both the leased and unleased portions of the airport, the litigants reached a settlement on
those areas leased to the airlines, and thus the court needed to decide only whether the
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were physically and conceptually analogous to public streets and
sidewalks, they should be considered traditional public fora.14 The
district court, agreeing with this assessment and determining that
the Port Authority regulation was not narrowly tailored to further
a compelling state interest,1 declared the regulation unconstitu-
tional and granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.16
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed in part, holding that the
terminal areas are nonpublic' 7 and that the government may there-
fore regulate protected speech in the terminals, provided that such
regulations are reasonable and viewpoint neutral.18
Writing for the court, Justice Winter recognized that "[t]he
'well-established' authority in other circuits is that airport termi-
nals are traditional public fora for speech activities." 9 Neverthe-
less, he concluded that -the Supreme Court's recent decision in
United States v. Kokinda,0 altered the traditional public-forum
regulations were permissible in those portions under the control of the Port Authority. Id.
at 578.
" See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 721 F. Supp. 572, 575
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd in part, rev'd in part, 925 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. granted, 60
U.S.L.W. 3083 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1992). The plaintiffs argued that the terminal buildings,
"[l]ined with all type of services 'from banks to barbers to Bloomingdales' ... possess the
characteristics of a bustling metropolitan boulevard... [and thus] 'fit well within the notion
of traditional public fora.' "Id. at 576-77 (quoting Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law at 25-26,
37, International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 721 F. Supp. 572 (S.D.N.Y.
1989)).
25 Id. at 577-79. The district court first set out the three-part forum analysis enunciated
in Perry Educ. Ass'n, see id. at 575, and then specifically relied on decisions in other circuits
that held that various factors are to be considered when determining the status of airports
as public or nonpublic fora. Id. at 577.
'6 Id. at 579. The district court agreed with plaintiffs that the terminals "possess the
characteristics of a bustling metropolitan boulevard." Id. at 576 (citing Plaintiffs' Memoran-
dum of Law at 37, International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 721 F. Supp.
572 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)). Noting that numerous Supreme Court decisions "have invited exten-
sion of the traditional public forum concept by analogy," the court held that the terminals,
"as the functional equivalent of public streets .... fit 'well within the notion of traditional
public fora.'" Id. at 577.
1:7 ISKCON, 925 F.2d. at 581.
,8 Id. at 580. Applying this standard, the court held that the regulation prohibiting
solicitation of funds did not violate the First Amendment because it was reasonably in-
tended to prevent disruption of air travelers. Id. at 582. The court found no similar justifica-
tion for the regulation prohibiting distribution of literature and therefore held this restric-
tion to be violative of the First Amendment. Id.
"1 Id. at 580 (citation omitted).
20 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990). In Kokinda, the plaintiffs, a political advocacy group, solicited
contributions on a sidewalk directly in front of the entrance to a post office. Id. at 3117. The
sidewalk, located entirely on post-office property and used exclusively for postal purposes,
constituted the sole means by which post office customers could travel from the parking lots
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analysis21 and mandated a different result.22 The ISKCON court
interpreted the plurality opinion in Kokinda as requiring courts to
determine the status of a forum not by assessing the overall char-
acter of the property, but by simply identifying the purpose for
which the property exists.23 Employing this single-faceted analysis,
the ISKCON court determined that because airport terminals exist
solely for the purpose of facilitating air travel, they are nonpublic
fora in which the government may properly prohibit the solicita-
tion of funds to prevent inconvenience to the public.24
In a strong dissent, Chief Judge Oakes rejected the majority's
assessment of Kokinda,25 which he found "neither controlling nor a
substantial deviation from the Court's [traditional] public forum
analysis. ' 26 Specifically, Chief Judge Oakes rejected the proposi-
tion that a forum's purpose alone can determine its status2 and
argued that Kokinda merely reaffirmed the traditional public-fo-
rum analysis, which turns not on a single factor, but on a complex
balancing of the character, pattern of activity, and essential pur-
to the post office building. Id. at 3118. The plaintiffs were convicted of violating a postal
regulation prohibiting solicitation of money on postal premises. Id. In upholding the regula-
tion, Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality of the Court, concluded that the sidewalk was
nonpublic for First Amendment purposes. Id. at 3120. In reaching this conclusion, Justice
O'Connor considered the physical character of the sidewalk, the degree of public access, its
tradition of use as a public forum, and its purpose and location. Id.; see also infra notes 45-
48 and accompanying text (discussion of sidewalk characteristics in Kokinda).
21 ISKCON, 925 F.2d at 580; see also infra note 23 and accompanying text (ISKCON
court's interpretation of plurality opinion in Kokinda).
22 ISKCON, 925 F.2d at 580.
2" Id. at 581. Specifically, the ISKCON court stated the following:
We read the plurality opinion of Justice O'Connor to distinguish between passage-
ways or other facilities that exist solely to facilitate the public's carrying on of a
particular endeavor-subway or air travel for example-and passageways or facili-
ties that enable the public to carry out the multitude of purposes persons pursue
in their daily life-the typical Main Street. The former are non-public fora ....
Id.
24 Id. at 581.
25 Id. at 584 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting) ("I would agree with the district court that the
airport terminals at issue are traditional public fora.").
2 Id. at 583 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting).
21 Id. at 584 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Oakes explained that
even reading Kokinda as controlling, there is no basis to conclude from the plural-
ity's opinion that a forum's purpose will, ipso facto, illuminate its status. In con-
cluding that the postal sidewalk was not a traditional public forum, Justice
O'Connor assessed not only the postal sidewalk's purpose, but also its location, the
degree of public access afforded by the sidewalk, and whether such sidewalks had
"'traditionally served as a place for free public assembly and communications of
thoughts by private citizens.' "
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3120).
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pose of a forum. 28
It is submitted that the ISKCON court erred in holding that
airport terminals are nonpublic fora. More importantly, it is sug-
gested that the court's interpretation of Kokinda distorts the pub-
lic-forum doctrine and seriously endangers basic First Amendment
protections. This Comment will first survey the approach taken by
other circuits in applying the public-forum doctrine to airport ter-
minals. Next, it will analyze the Supreme Court's decision in
Kokinda and assert that the ISKCON court misinterpreted that
decision as disposing of the need to weigh the First Amendment
rights of individuals against the proprietary rights of the govern-
ment. Finally, it will urge the Supreme Court to seize this opportu-
nity to resolve the status of airport terminals for First Amendment
purposes and to articulate a coherent standard to guide courts con-
fronted with this issue in the future.
I. AIRPORTS AND PUBLIC-FORUM DOCTRINE: THE TRADITIONAL
APPROACH
Under the traditional public-forum doctrine, numerous factors
are weighed to determine what level of scrutiny will be applied to
restrictions on protected speech.29 These factors were articulated
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Fer-
28 Id.
[T]he majority is simply wrong in concluding that Kokinda stands for the immu-
table proposition that facilities that exist solely for the "public's carrying on of a
particular endeavor... are nonpublic fora."
In short, I believe that Kokinda reaffirms the basic proposition that tradi-
tional public forum status does not turn on any single factor or characteristic.
Rather, a more complex balancing determination is necessary, in which it must be
determined whether "the character of the place, the pattern of usual activity, the
nature of its essential purpose and the population who take advantage of the gen-
eral invitation extended make it an appropriate place for communication of views
on issues of political and social significance." In other words, we balance the gov-
ernmental purposes of the forum on the one hand against the tradition of public
access to that forum, and the interests of those who wish to use the forum for
another purpose, on the other hand.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
29 See Dienes, supra note 3, at 114 ("character of the forum, the relationship of the
speech to the place of protest, and the degree of interference with the normal functioning of
the forum are all variables" in balancing government's proprietary interests against
speaker's First Amendment rights); see also Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public
Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 16 (discussing early development of public-
forum theory and numerous factors and interests to be weighed).
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nandes v. Limmer.30 According to the Fifth Circuit, courts should
consider the "character of the place, the pattern of usual activity,
the nature of its essential purpose and the population who take
advantage of the general invitation" in determining whether the
property is an "appropriate place for communication of views on
issues of political and social significance." 3' Applying these criteria,
the Fernandes court concluded that the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport
terminal contained areas that were public fora.32
Prior to Fernandes, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, in Chicago Area Military Project v. City of
Chicago ("CAMP"),33 considered these same factors and observed
the similarities between the O'Hare Airport terminal and a public
street, traditionally open to First Amendment speech, before con-
cluding that the airport terminal was a public forum. 4
30 663 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1124 (1982). In Fernandes, a
member of the International Society of Krishna Consciousness, Inc., sought to enjoin en-
forcement of an ordinance banning distribution of literature and solicitation of funds at the
Dallas-Fort Worth airport complex. Id. at 623. The Fifth Circuit invalidated the ordinance
on the grounds that it was overbroad and that it unduly restricted protected speech. Id. at
633; see also infra note 32 (setting forth Fernandes court's rationale for concluding that
terminals were public fora).
31 Fernandes, 663 F.2d at 626 (citing Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. City of West
Palm Beach, 457 F.2d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1972) (quoting Wolin v. Port of New York Auth.,
392 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968))).
" Id. The Fernandes court noted that the airport complex served the major cities of
Dallas and Fort Worth and functioned as a hub for connecting regional air traffic. Id. at
623-24. In addition, the complex, covering 18,000 acres, contained a hotel, bank, and numer-
ous commercial establishments. Id. In considering these factors, the Fernandes court stated
that "[fln view of the lack of restrictions on entry by the general public, and the commer-
cial, street-like character of the terminal concourses .... the ... terminal buildings must be
treated as public for[a]." Id. at 627. The court distinguished, however, the terminal areas
that are available to the public from those areas available only to airline personnel and
ticketed passengers. Id. In so doing the court pointed out that "those parts of the terminals
restricted to airline personnel are private, absent unusual circumstances. Likewise, the arri-
val and departure gates, where only ticketed passengers may go, are not public forums." Id.
-- 508 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). The plaintiffs in CAMP
were members of a nonprofit political advocacy group who were threatened with arrest by
city police for distributing the group's newspaper to members of the armed forces and to the
general public in the terminal buildings of O'Hare Airport in Chicago. Id. at 923. The de-
fendants claimed that this activity was prohibited by an oral regulation providing in sub-
stance that no person "shall be permitted to picket, sell anything... distribute literature of
any nature, or solicit or collect contributions within any building at any airport operated by
the City of Chicago." Id. at 924.
"' Id. at 925. The defendants in CAMP raised arguments similar to those raised by the
defendants in ISKCON. Compare ISKCON, 925 F.2d at 578-79 with CAMP, 508 F.2d at
924-25. For instance, the CAMP defendants argued that the terminal areas were nonpublic
because their "function, location, and often congested condition" made them inappropriate
fora for protected speech. Id. at 925. Furthermore, the defendants claimed that the invita-
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More recently, both the Ninth and Eighth Circuits have held
that airport terminals are public fora. In Jews for Jesus, Inc. v.
Board of Airport Commissioners,35 the Ninth Circuit invoked the
criteria set forth in Fernandes"6 and CAMP37 and found that the
Los Angeles International Airport terminal was a public forum.38
Similarly, in Jamison v. City of St. Louis,3 9 the Eighth Circuit
tion to the public to enter the terminal was limited to the purpose of air travel. Id. The
CAMP court rejected the former argument by distinguishing nonpublic fora such as hospi-
tals, libraries, office buildings, and prisons, whose function may require restrictive regulation
of protected speech, from the nonsecured, wide-open spaces of the terminals at O'Hare Air-
port, which are freely accessible to the general public. Id.; see also United States S.W. Af-
rica/Namibia Trade & Cultural Council v. United States, 708 F.2d 760, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
("Although not every form of speech is necessarily consistent with the airports' primary use,
it seems clear that the public places in these airports are far more akin to such public [fora]
as streets and common areas than [to such nonpublic fora] as prisons, buses, and military
bases.").
CAMP also rejected the defendants' argument that the purpose of the terminal was
limited to facilitating air travel as being neither "supported by the evidence" nor "realistic"
and noted that "great numbers of people are freely admitted to the public areas of the
terminal buildings not only in connection with air travel, but also for shopping, dining,
sightseeing, or merely to satisfy their curiosity." CAMP, 508 F.2d at 925.
- 785 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd on other grounds, 482 U.S. 569 (1987). In Jews for
Jesus, a minister of a religious group was approached by a Department of Airports peace
officer while he was distributing free literature in the terminal of the Los Angeles Interna-
tional Airport. Id. at 792. The minister was shown a resolution promulgated by the Board of
Airport Commissioners that banned all First Amendment activities within the terminal area
of the airport, was told his activities violated this resolution, and was threatened with legal
action if he persisted. Id. The resolution was challenged, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's ruling that the terminal was a traditional public forum and invalidated the
resolution, finding its total ban on First Amendment activities to be unconstitutional. Id. at
795.
"' Id. at 795; see also supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing specific aspects
of Fernandes case).
17 Jews for Jesus, 785 F.2d at 794; see also supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text
(discussing specific aspects of CAMP case).
38 Jews for Jesus, 785 F.2d at 794-95. The Jews for Jesus court relied on its earlier
rulings in Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1245 (9th Cir. 1981) (First Amendment
to be given full effect in public areas of airport terminals) and Kuszynski v. City of Oakland,
479 F.2d 1130, 1131 (9th Cir. 1973) (because airport is public property, "free speech may be
abridged only by regulations narrowly drawn to serve legitimate interests of the general
public") to conclude that the Los Angeles International Airport terminal was a public fo-
rum. Jews for Jesus, 785 F.2d at 793-95.
39 828 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 987 (1988). In Jamison, a former
airline employee submitted a written request to the director of the Lambert-St. Louis Air-
port for permission to picket his former employer in protest for what he believed was a
discriminatory discharge based upon his mental illness. Id. at 1281. Specifically, Jamison
requested permission to picket "at the foot of concourse C, near the glass wall, to be sure
that [he did] not obstruct any passenger traffic, which . . . [was] not [his] intention." Id.
Based upon the director's fear that Jamison's manic-depressive mental disorder would
render him a danger to the public, the director refused to grant him permission to picket.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:207
noted that the Lambert-St. Louis Airport terminal, "lined by
shops, restaurants, newsstands, and other businesses, with trav-
elers or other members of the general public coming and going as
they please" resembled a traditional public thoroughfare and was
thus a public forum for purposes of First Amendment analysis.40
Although the ISKCON court acknowledged the heavy weight
of authority in other circuits holding that airport terminals are
public fora,41 it reached the opposite conclusion based upon its
reading of the Supreme Court's decision in Kokinda.42
II. ISKCON's INTERPRETATION OF Kokinda
In Kokinda, the United States Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether a postal sidewalk, lacking the characteristics
of a public sidewalk traditionally open to First Amendment activ-
ity, nevertheless constituted a public forum.43 In concluding that
the postal sidewalk was not a traditional public forum, 44 the Court
Id. at 1281 n.3. However, because the city was unable to demonstrate that Jamison was, in
fact, a danger to the public or that excluding all persons with Jamison's form of mental
illness would further the city's legitimate interests in security and efficiency, the Jamison
court concluded that the denial of permission to picket violated Jamison's First Amendment
rights. Id. at 1284.
'0 Id. at 1283. The Jamison court noted that under the analysis delineated in CAMP,
Fernandes, and their progeny, the terminal at Lambert-St. Louis Airport was a traditional
public forum. Id. In addition, the court relied on a city rule that implicitly acknowledged
"that the concourse of a large airport facility.., has the character, pattern of activity, and
nature of purpose that make it an appropriate place for the communication of views." Id.
The analogy between airport terminals and public thoroughfares was also addressed in
Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Berger, 716 F. Supp. 140, 150 (D.N.J. 1989), rev'd in
part, 894 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1990), in which the court recognized the similarities between
airport terminals and public streets, but noted the different functions served by each. Id. In
particular, the Gannett court found the two places to be analogous as "natural gathering
places for people with an interest and expectation that certain types of public activity are
permitted and in fact will take place," but stated that airports lacked a long tradition of
devotion to public assembly, contained a limited amount of space, and were maintained
primarily to serve air travelers. Id. Nevertheless, the Gannett court concluded that these
differences alone were insufficient for airports to be deemed nonpublic fora; rather, the
court suggested that these "subtle differences and competing interests" should be recog-
nized and balanced in analyzing the status of the forum. Id. at 149-50. Because the appel-
lant did not challenge the district court's analysis, the Third Circuit accepted the district
court's finding that the terminal area of Newark Airport (one of the airports at issue in
ISKCON) was a public forum. Gannett, 894 F.2d at 64.
41 See ISKCON, 925 F.2d at 580.
4'2 Id. at 580-82; see also supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (discussing ISKCON
court's interpretation of Kokinda).
" See supra note 20 (setting forth facts of Kokinda).
" Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3120. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia
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considered several factors, including the physical character of the
property," its traditional use as a forum for expressive activity,46
its purpose and location,47 and the degree of public access afforded
by the sidewalk. 8 Writing for the plurality, Justice O'Connor em-
phasized that the postal sidewalk was constructed "solely to assist
postal patrons" in obtaining access to the post office and "not to
facilitate the daily commerce and life of the neighborhood or
city. '49 The ISKCON court seized upon this language in conclud-
ing that Kokinda had altered the public-forum doctrine to require
an analysis focusing solely on the purpose for which a forum is
used.50 Despite Justice O'Connor's recognition of the other factors
joined Justice O'Connor in concluding that the sidewalk was nonpublic. Id. at 3115. Justice
Kennedy, who concurred in the judgment, found it unnecessary to decide the status of the
postal sidewalk because he construed the postal regulation as a reasonable time, manner,
and place restriction that would be constitutional regardless of whether the sidewalk was
public or nonpublic. Id. at 3125-26 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy observed,
however, that "there remains a powerful argument that, because of the wide range of activi-
ties that the Government permits to take place on this postal sidewalk, it is more than a
nonpublic forum." Id. at 3125 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
15 Id. at 3120. Noting that the "mere physical characteristics of the property cannot
dictate forum analysis," Kokinda compared the character of the postal sidewalk at issue to
that of a nearby municipal sidewalk, a sidewalk located inside a military base, and a side-
walk located on a public street, and determined that the postal sidewalk did not have the
"characteristics of public sidewalks traditionally open to expressive activity." Id.
46 Id. at 3121. The court in Kokinda assessed whether the postal sidewalk had "tradi-
tionally served as a place for free public assembly and communication of thoughts by pri-
vate citizens," id. (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976)), and concluded that it
was this inquiry that "animated our traditional public forum analysis and that we apply
today." Id.
47 Id. The Kokinda court reiterated a well-recognized principle of traditional public-
forum analysis in stating that the "location and purpose of a publicly-owned sidewalk is
critical to determining whether such a sidewalk constitutes a public forum." Id.
48 Id. at 3120. Kokinda distinguished the right of access afforded to the public by the
postal sidewalk from that afforded by the quintessential residential public sidewalk at issue
in Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (acknowledging right of access to residential streets
but upholding ban on "focused" picketing).
41 Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3120.
50 ISKCON, 925 F.2d at 580. After determining that the status of airport terminals
depends solely on their purpose, the ISKCON court concluded that the sole purpose of
airport terminals is to serve air travelers. Id. at 581.
Persons using the passageways in terminals are not there primarily to meet a
friend for lunch, windowshop, take the air, or engage in any of the multitude of
other purposes for which typical downtown streets are used. They are there solely
as air travelers, persons connected with air travelers, or employees of businesses
serving air travelers.
Id. However, this conclusion has been rejected by other circuit courts. See, e.g., CAMP, 508
F.2d at 925 ("great numbers of people are freely admitted to the public areas of the termi-
nal buildings not only in connection with air travel, but also for shopping, dining, sightsee-
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to be considered in a public-forum analysis,5 the ISKCON court
looked only to purpose and concluded that airport terminals are
nonpublic fora because they "exist solely to accommodate the
needs of air travelers. '5 2
While the purpose served by property has always been a sig-
nificant element in traditional public-forum analysis,5 it has never
been the sole consideration and was only one of several factors dis-
cussed in Kokinda.54 It is therefore submitted that the Second Cir-
cuit misapplied Kokinda, and that the traditional multifaceted
analysis continues to be the governing standard for determining
the level of scrutiny applicable to governmental regulation of First
Amendment freedoms.
The ISKCON court's belief "that Kokinda has altered public
forum analysis" 55 contrasts with other circuits' adherence to the
traditional public-forum doctrine. 6 Indeed, in Paulsen v. County
of Nassau,57 decided only four days prior to ISKCON, the Second
Circuit itself invoked the public-forum doctrine without suggesting
that it had been altered by the Kokinda Court.58 The Paulsen case
arose from the restriction of protected speech in and around the
ing, or merely to satisfy their curiosity"); Fernandes, 663 F.2d at 627 ("The parallel between
public streets and ... terminal buildings, where air travelers as well as the general public
may shop, dine, imbibe, and sightsee, is clear and powerful.").
61 Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3120-21; see also supra notes 45-48 (setting forth factors
considered).
" ISKCON, 925 F.2d at 581 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting).
53 See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 827, 837-38 (1976) (national security purposes of
military post weighed heavily in favor of finding that military reservation was not tradi-
tional public forum); Pearson v. United States, 581 A.2d 347, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 51 (1991) (integrity of judicial process was significant factor in finding
that Supreme Court grounds are not traditional public fora).
54 See Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3120-21; see also supra notes 43-48 (court must consider
physical characteristics, purpose, location and traditional use). "While it is proper to weigh
the need to maintain the dignity and purpose of a public building .. .other factors may
point to the conclusion that the Government must permit wider access to the forum than it
has otherwise intended." Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3125 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
66 ISKCON, 925 F.2d at 580.
66 See, e.g., Sentinel Communications Co. v. Watts, 936 F.2d 1189 (11th Cir. 1991);
Paulsen v. County of Nassau, 925 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1991); Brown v. Palmer, 915 F.2d 1435
(10th Cir. 1990), aff'd on reh'g, 944 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1991); see also infra notes 59-72 and
accompanying text (Tenth and Eleventh Circuits did not view Kokinda as altering public-
forum doctrine).
:7 925 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1991).
66 See id. at 69-71. Circuit Judges Kaufman, Newman, and McLaughlin heard Paulsen,
id. at 66, whereas Chief Judge Oakes and Circuit Judges Winter and Miner decided ISK-
CON. ISKCON, 925 F.2d at 577.
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Nassau County Veteran's Memorial Coliseum.5 9 In determining
that the coliseum was a designated public forum,60 the Paulsen
court considered several factors, including government intent,61 the
purpose of the property,62 its tradition of use for expressive activ-
ity,6 3 the nature of the property, and its compatibility with expres-
sive activity.6 4 It must be emphasized, of course, that although
both Kokinda and ISKCON involved traditional public-forum
questions, the issue in Paulsen was whether the coliseum was a
designated public forum.6 5 Nevertheless, the Paulsen court cited
Paulsen, 925 F.2d at 67. In Paulsen, members of the Christian Joy Fellowship sought
a preliminary injunction after they were arrested for distributing religious leaflets on the
sidewalks and in the mall surrounding the Nassau County Veterans' Memorial Coliseum. Id.
at 67-68. The coliseum, which is publicly owned and privately managed, consists of an
18,000 seat arena surrounded by "sidewalks, pedestrian thoroughfares and numerous park-
ing lots." Id. at 67. The district court granted the injunction, concluding that the coliseum
was a designated public forum subject only to reasonable time, place, and manner restric-
tions absent a compelling state interest. Id. at 68. In affirming the district court's ruling, the
Second Circuit rejected the county's argument that because the coliseum had been built for
the purpose of making money, it was nonpublic. Id. at 70. Instead, in gleaning the govern-
ment's intent with respect to the coliseum, the court applied a multifaceted analysis in
which purpose was but one of the factors considered. See id. at 69-71; see also infra notes
60-64 and accompanying text.
00 Paulsen, 925 F.2d at 71.
Id. at 69. Although it recognized that the government's intent is essential in deter-
mining whether a public forum has been created, the Paulsen court observed that "[i]ntent
is not merely a matter of stated purpose" and "must be inferred from a number of objective
factors." Id.
02 Id. at 69-70. In assessing the purpose served by the coliseum, the Paulsen court
looked to the Nassau County Charter, which provided that "the Coliseum may be leased for
'education, enlightenment, cultural development or betterment .... and ... civic, commu-
nity and general public interest."' Id. at 69 (quoting Nassau County Charter § 2206-
a(2)(a)). In addition, the court recognized that the Nassau County Board of Supervisors had
made efforts to regulate the distribution of commercial, rather than noncommercial, litera-
ture. Id. at 70. In light of the "strong indicia" of intent to dedicate the coliseum to the
public, Paulsen rejected the county's argument that the coliseum was constructed for the
purpose of "generat[ing] economic benefits" and should thus be considered nonpublic. Id.
13 Id. at 70. The Paulsen court noted that the coliseum had been used for "parades,
political rallies and speeches, religious weddings and circuses," had hosted "rent-free chari-
table events," had permitted patrons to routinely display banners containing political
messages, and, before the current management took over, had regularly permitted solicita-
tion of contributions and distribution of literature by personal interest groups. Id.
8 Id. at 70-71. Noting that the coliseum grounds "contain[] a large outside area which
includes a mall and'a network of sidewalks" and is "frequently the site of boisterous recrea-
tional activity," the Paulsen court distinguished the coliseum from "a post office, military
base[] or [a] federal workplace[]." Id. at 70 (citations omitted).
"' Compare id. at 71 (classifying coliseum as "public forum by government designa-
tion") with Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3118 (lower court "held that the postal sidewalk is a
traditional public forum") and ISKCON, 925 F.2d at 577 (terminals "are traditional public
fora for expressive activity").
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Kokinda to support basic constitutional principles without finding
that the Supreme Court had in any way modified the public-forum
doctrine."
Two other circuit courts have similarly acknowledged Kokinda
without deviating from the traditional public-forum doctrine.6 7 In
Sentinel Communications Co. v. Watts,"6 the Eleventh Circuit ex-
amined government intent as well as the nature and purpose of
public rest areas and determined that a Florida interstate rest area
was a nonpublic forum.6 9 Furthermore, in Brown v. Palmer, ° the
Tenth Circuit focused on the government's intent in conducting
open-house celebrations at an airforce base and concluded that
"the military did not intend to open [the base] to plaintiffs and
other individuals or groups seeking to convey ideological or politi-
cal messages."' 71 Like Paulsen, neither Sentinel nor Brown inter-
preted Kokinda as having any impact on the public-forum doc-
trine,72 and it is suggested that these cases support the conclusion
'1 See Paulsen, 925 F.2d at 70-71.
67 See supra note 56 and infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
68 936 F.2d 1189 (11th Cir. 1991).
69 Id. at 1203-04. In Sentinel, a newspaper publisher challenged a state regulation
prohibiting the installation of coin-operated newsracks in two public rest areas along an
interstate highway in Florida. Id. at 1191. The regulation made it "'unlawful to make any
commercial use of the right-of-way of any state-maintained road, including.., rest areas.'"
Id. at 1191 n.1 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 337.406 (West 1989)).
The Sentinel court characterized the establishment of rest areas as primarily a "safety
measure" that provides for "emergency stopping and resting by motorists for short periods"
and distinguished rest areas from local parks in that "[a]reas for family leisure picnics, ac-
tive recreation, waterfront activities, or overnight camping are not to be developed as part of
an Interstate highway." Id. at 1204.
In deciding that a rest area was not a designated public forum, the Sentinel court em-
phasized the terms "safety" and "rest" and determined that the nature and purpose of an
interstate rest area, while necessarily permitting "chatting and stretching one's legs, or re-
laxing ... with a newspaper," did not "amount to the dedication of such property to speech
activities." Id.
70 915 F.2d 1435 (1990), aff 'd on reh'g, 944 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1991).
71 Id. at 1443. The Brown court noted the special nature of military bases and the judi-
cial reluctance to label such governmental property as a public forum. Id. at 1441 ("The
Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that a military base can be transformed into a
public forum only in extreme circumstances."). Applying the standard set forth by the Su-
preme Court in Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972), which marks the only time
such "extreme circumstances" were found to exist, the Brown court concluded that because
the government had not "abandoned any claim of special interest in regulating the open
house celebrations," the airforce base was not a public forum. Brown, 915 F.2d at 1441-43.
71 See, e.g., Sentinel, 936 F.2d at 1201 (citing Kokinda in support of different levels of
scrutiny to be applied to "tripartite conceptual framework" developed under public-forum
doctrine); Brown, 915 F.2d at 1443 (citing Kokinda for proposition that government does
not designate its property for expressive activities merely by permitting limited discourse by
ISKCON v. LEE
that Kokinda has not reduced the traditional public-forum doc-
trine to a simplistic "purpose" analysis.
III. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF ISKCON
Through its restrictive construction of Kokinda, the ISKCON
court dismissed over twenty years of precedent affecting a wide va-
riety of fora. Rather than balancing the First Amendment interests
of individuals against the legitimate proprietary concerns of the
government, the ISKCON analysis focused solely on the purpose of
airport terminals.73 The flaw in this analysis is that it is difficult to
imagine any government-owned property that exists solely for the
purpose of expressive activity. 4 Under the ISKCON analysis, it
appears that even public streets, sidewalks, and parks, historically
considered traditional public fora, arguably could be deemed non-
public. Such a result would eviscerate basic First Amendment pro-
tections and would provide ammunition to critics who claim that
the public-forum doctrine emphasizes the technical nature of prop-
erty at the expense of fundamental First Amendment values.7 5
IV. SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The ISKCON case was decided by the Second Circuit in Feb-
ruary 1991.76 Subsequently, the plaintiffs petitioned for rehearing
en banc. 7 The en banc petition was denied by a majority of the
court without comment, but three judges dissented and urged that
the court review the ruling.78 Writing for the dissent, Chief Judge
Oakes urged reconsideration of the case to resolve the "clear-cut
conflict among the circuits" created by the majority's characteriza-
tion of airport terminals as nonpublic fora,79 to clarify the Second
some individuals or groups).
71 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
" See ISKCON, 925 F.2d at 583. (Oakes, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Oakes illus-
trated this fact by noting that the Supreme Court has previously held that the primary
purpose of a public thoroughfare, which is recognized as the model public forum, is to facili-
tate the movement of people and property and not to foster First Amendment activity. Id.
71 See supra note 3; see also Davis, supra note 8, at 629-30 (suggesting that in Board of
Airport Comm'rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987), the Supreme Court missed an
opportunity to refocus public-forum doctrine on First Amendment considerations).
76 ISKCON, 925 F.2d at 576.
77 Id. at 587.
78 Id. at 587-88 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting on petition for rehearing). Chief Judge Oakes
was joined in his dissent by Circuit Judges Newman and Cardamone.
71 Id. at 587 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting on petition for rehearing).
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Circuit's understanding of Kokinda,s0 and to reconcile the panel's
conclusion that a forum's purpose alone determines its status as a
public or nonpublic forum.8' For these reasons, and because adop-
tion of the ISKCON rationale will endanger First Amendment pro-
tections,"2 the Supreme Court, having granted certiorari, 3 should
use this opportunity to settle these issues once and for all.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has suggested that airport terminals should be
considered public fora under the traditional public-forum analysis
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Kokinda. According to the
Second Circuit, however, because an airport terminal exists "solely
to facilitate ...air travel,"84 it is nonpublic, and, consequently,
content-based restrictions on speech in airport terminals will not
be subjected to the strict scrutiny applicable to public fora. The
ISKCON court read Kokinda as requiring courts to focus solely on
the purpose of property in determining whether that property is
public or nonpublic. If this interpretation is permitted to stand
and is adopted by other circuits, the public-forum doctrine will
cease to be a useful method for balancing First Amendment rights
of individuals against the government's proprietary right to control
the use of its property. Rather, it will become a dangerous tool
capable of repressing basic First Amendment freedoms of speech
and expression. At a time when it seems that individual freedoms
are under constant attack from both legislators and the judiciary,
the Supreme Court should seize the opportunity to prevent the ad-
dition of another weapon to the government's arsenal.
Barbara Lynn Hall
8I Id.
1' Id. Chief Judge Oakes reiterated his belief that a forum's status should not be deter-
mined solely on the basis of purpose but that the court should adhere to its "longstanding
doctrine that the status of a forum is determined by a complex balancing of competing
factors, none of which alone is dispositive." Id. at 587-88 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting on petition
for rehearing).
82 Id. at 587 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting on petition for rehearing) ("[Tihe panel's reading
of Kokinda will, at a minimum, constitute bad law for our circuit, and, at most, have ex-
tremely deleterious consequences for future public fora jurisprudence.").
83 Petition for certiorari was filed on July 24, 1991 and granted Jan. 10, 1992. See Inter-
national Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 60 U.S.L.W. 3475 (U.S. 1992).
84 ISKCON, 925 F.2d at 581.
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